Livro Darwin's Doubt do Dr. Stephen Meyer: best-seller no New York Times, para desespero da Nomenklatura Científica

terça-feira, agosto 27, 2013



Darwin sabia que sua teoria da evolução através da seleção natural não explicava, e nem suas versões atualizadas explicam, a Explosão Cambriana. Este livro responde às dúvidas de Darwin e deixa a Nomenklatura Científica e a Galera dos meninos e meninas de Darwin desolados, pois fica patente no livro Darwin's Doubt, de Stephen Meyer, que Darwin e nem seus discípulos contemporâneos explicam a origem da informação genética necessária para a origem das espécies!

Darwin kaput desde 1859, e a nova teoria geral da evolução - a SÍNTESE EVOLUTIVA AMPLIADA/ESTENDIDA, se não incorporar teoricamente a questão da informação genética, será em 2020 uma teoria científica natimorta...

Fui, nem sei por que, rindo da cara daqueles que diziam que a teoria da evolução de Darwin através da seleção natural e n mecanismos evolucionários de A a Z não estava passando por nenhuma crise no contexto de justificação teórica. Nada mais falso. Aliás, mentir em nome de Darwin é costume dessa turma!

Já não se fazem mais darwinistas como antigamente...

segunda-feira, agosto 26, 2013

“… alguns de nossos bons amigos, biólogos experimentais com patentes registradas (geralmente conhecidos como biólogos ‘com a mão na massa’) que leram versões prévias deste manuscrito, bateram em nossos pulsos porque eles pensam que o que nós estamos dizendo é um exagero. Eles nos disseram, ‘ninguém é mais este tipo de darwinista.’ Nós ficaríamos felizes se isso fosse verdade, mas há boa razão para se duvidar de que seja assim. E se for verdade, a notícia não tem sido amplamente disseminada entre os biólogos ‘com a mão na massa’ …”

“… some of our good friends, patented experimental biologists (usually known as ‘wet’ biologists) who have read previous versions of this manuscript, slapped us on the wrist because they think what we are saying is overkill. They told us, ‘no one is that kind of Darwinian anymore.’ We’d be happy if that were so, but there is good reason to doubt that it is. And if it is true, the news has not been widely disseminated even among wet biologists …”

- Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini, What Darwin Got Wrong (London: Profile Books, 2010), p. 91.



Isso explica, em parte, o silêncio dos darwinistas aqui no Brasil sobre a fragorosa falência da teoria da evolução de Darwin através da seleção natural  n mecanismos evolucionários (de A a Z) no contexto de justificação teórica.

Por que o fato, Fato, FATO da evolução não é assim uma Brastemp epistemológica?

1. As mutações não são aleatórias.

2. As características adquiridas podem ser hereditárias.

3. A visão genocêntrica da evolução está errada.

4. A evolução não é um processo gradual gene a gene, mas deve ser macromutacional.

5. Os cientistas não têm tido a capacidade de criar novas espécies em laboratório ou estufa, e nós não temos visto a especiação ocorrer na natureza.

QED: Darwin kaput desde 1859 na explicação da origem das espécies! E estamos fazendo biologia evolucionária no vácuo epistêmico...

Ué, mas nos ensinaram nas universidades que A CIÊNCIA ABOMINA O VÁCUO EPISTEMOLÓGICO! Então, como está sendo feita a CIÊNCIA NORMAL em biologia evolucionária? Abracadabra? Entranhas de animais? Cartas de Tarô? Búzios? Leitura de mão? Horóscopo??? 

O cerne do livro Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, de Thomas Nagel

terça-feira, agosto 20, 2013

The Core of ‘Mind and Cosmos’


This is a brief statement of positions defended more fully in my book “Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False,” which was published by Oxford University Press last year. Since then the book has attracted a good deal of critical attention, which is not surprising, given the entrenchment of the world view that it attacks. It seemed useful to offer a short summary of the central argument.

The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory.

This means that the scientific outlook, if it aspires to a more complete understanding of nature, must expand to include theories capable of explaining the appearance in the universe of mental phenomena and the subjective points of view in which they occur – theories of a different type from any we have seen so far. 

Read more here/Leia mais aqui: The New York Times

Richard Dawkins não sabe Nada sobre o NADA!

segunda-feira, agosto 12, 2013

As reações contra os resultados do ENCODE foram motivadas contra o design inteligente!

sábado, agosto 03, 2013

The extent of functionality in the human genome

John S Mattick123* and Marcel E Dinger12

* Corresponding author: John S Mattick

Author Affiliations

1 Garvan Institute of Medical Research, Darlinghurst NSW 2010, Australia

2 St Vincent’s Clinical School, University of New South Wales, Kensington NSW 2052, Australia

3 School of Biotechnology & Biomolecular Sciences, University of New South Wales, Kensington NSW 2052, Australia

For all author emails, please log on.

The HUGO Journal 2013, 7:2 doi:10.1186/1877-6566-7-2

Received: 28 April 2013
Accepted: 2 July 2013
Published: 15 July 2013

© 2013 Mattick and Dinger; licensee Springer. 

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.


Recently articles have been published disputing the main finding of the ENCODE project that the majority of the human genome exhibits biochemical indices of function, based primarily on low sequence conservation and the existence of larger genomes in some ostensibly simpler organisms (the C-value enigma), indicating the likely presence of significant amounts of junk. Here we challenge these arguments, showing that conservation is a relative measure based on circular assumptions of the non-functionality of transposon-derived sequences and uncertain comparison sets, and that regulatory sequence evolution is subject to different and much more plastic structure-function constraints than protein-coding sequences, as well as positive selection for adaptive radiation. We also show that polyploidy accounts for the higher than expected genome sizes in some eukaryotes, compounded by variable levels of repetitive sequences of unknown significance. We argue that the extent of precise dynamic and differential cell- and tissue-specific transcription and splicing observed from the majority of the human genome is a more reliable indicator of genetic function than conservation, although the unexpectedly large amount of regulatory RNA presents a conceptual challenge to the traditional protein-centric view of human genetic programming. Finally, we suggest that resistance to these findings is further motivated in some quarters by the use of the dubious concept of junk DNA as evidence against intelligent design.


A hipótese do gene egoísta de Dawkins foi para a lata do lixo da História da Ciência???

quinta-feira, agosto 01, 2013

Evolutionary instability of Zero Determinant strategies demonstrates that winning isn't everything

Christoph Adami, Arend Hintze

(Submitted on 13 Aug 2012 (v1), last revised 25 Jun 2013 (this version, v4))

Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma irrespective of the opponent's strategy, or else to set the ratio between a ZD player's and their opponent's expected payoff. Here we show that while ZD strategies are weakly dominant, they are not evolutionarily stable and will instead evolve into less coercive strategies. We show that ZD strategies with an informational advantage over other players that allows them to recognize other ZD strategies can be evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an advantage is bound to be short-lived as opposing strategies evolve to counteract the recognition.

Comments: 14 pages, 4 figures. Change in title (again!) to comply with Nature Communications requirements. To appear in Nature Communications
Subjects: Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE); Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems (nlin.AO); Neurons and Cognition (q-bio.NC)

Cite as: arXiv:1208.2666 [q-bio.PE]
  (or arXiv:1208.2666v4 [q-bio.PE] for this version)

Submission history
From: Christoph Adami [view email] 

[v1] Mon, 13 Aug 2012 19:00:24 GMT (113kb,D)
[v2] Fri, 12 Oct 2012 17:59:44 GMT (99kb,D)
[v3] Fri, 21 Jun 2013 14:01:18 GMT (1910kb,D)
[v4] Tue, 25 Jun 2013 13:16:31 GMT (1910kb,D)